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11. ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Erred in Concludi~lgthat the Fourth District Can Lawfully
Require Bail Agents to Submit to Criminal History Checks
The legislature appropriately exercised its police power by conditioning bail agents'

license on a character and fitness evaluation. Conversely, regulating individual bail agents'
character and fitness is neither a procedural function within the court's rule-making authority nor
within the ADJ's administrative supervision over the operation of the district courts.

In defending the lawfulness of the supplemental criminal history check,' the Fourth
District contends that the Idaho Bail Act2represents the legislature's transfer of power from the
courts to bail agents and that it must determine bail agents' character and fitness in light of its
purported "daily interaction" with bail agents and the potential for abusive bail practices. As set
forth herein and in the Bail Plaintiffs' previous briefing, statutes and coui-t rules recognizing that
a bail bond issued by a qualified corporate surety is "sufficient" do not interfere with the Fourth
District's inherent authority. Additionally, neither abusive practices nor daily interaction with
bail agents justify the Fourth District's insistence on supplementing the DOI's evaluation of bail
agents' character and fitness. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's
conclusion that the Guidelines can lawfully require bail agents to submit to supplemental
criminal history checks.

'

The Fourth District incorporates its briefing in its appeal in response to the Bail
Plaintiffs' first issue on cross-appeal. We reply accordingly to this incorporated briefing.

*

Idaho Session Law 2009, ch. 90, 3 2, eff. July 1, 2009.

1.

The Idaho Rail Act and Idaho Criminal Rules do not invade the Fourth
District's inherent authority

In contending courts have inherent authority to determine which bail agents "operate in
their courtrooms," the Fourth District cites to Lendev v. Reinev, 143 Idaho 635, 639-40, 151 P.3d
831, 836-37 (2007), in which the Supreme Court referenced the court's former authority to
determine the sufficiency of private sureties pursuant to LC. 5 19-2909. Appellants' Brief, pg.
14. In Leader, the Court noted that bail bonds did not exist when then applicable bail statutes
were enacted and instead, at that time, a defendant could post bail in cash or "have two sufficient
sureties execute and acltnowledge before the judge the undertaking of sufficient bail. I.C. 3
19-2909." 143 Idaho at 639, 151 P.3d at 836. Since the Lender decision, I.C. 5 19-2909 was
repealed and replaced with the Idaho Bail Act, which explicitly defines a bail bond as a
"sufficient" surety and no longer authorizes courts to determine the sufficiency of individual
sureties. LC. 5 19-2907; Idaho Session Law 2009, ch. 90, 5 2.
The Fourth District alleges the Bail Act represents a "legislative trend" revealing "a
transfer in power from the courts to bail agencies and individual bail agents" and though it is one
thing to repeal old legislation, "it is quite another when the Legislature passes new bail laws that
conflict with Guidelines issued pursuant to an Order of the Idaho Supreme Court, precluding
courts from regulating in an area that has historically been reserved for the courts." Appellants'
Reply Brief, pg. 1,3. However, as noted by the district coui-t in its Memorandum Opinion and
Order, ill 1979, the Idaho "Supreme Court explicitly recognized the posting of bail by use of
surety bond" when it adopted the Idaho Criminal Rules and Misdemeanor Rules. R. (Vol. 111) pg.
453-54. Before the 2009 amendments, I.C.R. 46(d) provided that a "bail bond issued by a

qualified corporate surety" could be given as security and "prohibited the court from requiring
that "bail be posted only in casb" or from specifying differing amounts for bail depending upon
whether it was posted "by corporate surety" or other r n e a n ~ . ~
Contrary to the Fourth District's contention that the Bail Act gave "more power to bail
agencies and individual bondmen, and has taken that power from the courts" [Appellants' Reply
Brief, pg. 31, the Bail Act simply updated bail statutes to apply to commercial bail bonds as had
been provided for decades earlier in the Idaho Criminal and Misdemeanor Rules and Title 41 of
the Idaho Code. As the Leader Court provided: "modifying the statutes to make them applicable
to bail bond agents and surety companies is the province of the legislature." Id. at 640, 151 P.3d
at 837. Further, in adopting court rules recognizing that a properly qualified bail bond is a
sufficient surety, this Court did not improperly invade any inherent authority to determine the
"sufficiency" of sureties held by the Fourth District.
Both this Court and the Idaho Legislature have recognized that a bail bond issued by a
corporate surety is a "sufficient" surety. Therefore, the Fourth District lacks the authority inherent or otherwise -to further assure the sufficiency of such bail bonds by requiring
individual bail agents to become a second surety on the bail bond and regulating those agents'
character and fitness.
Idaho court rules and statutes are thus distinct from those in extra-jurisdictional cases
relied on by the Fourth District, including Peak v. Richardson, No. 1:06cv0176 TCM, 2008 WL
7621 10 (E. D. Mo. 2008)(unpublished) (discussing conflict between court rule authorizing
circuit judge to determine whether "surety" on bail bond is "reputable" and insurance statutes).
Additionally, the Fourth District's reliance on cases discussing judicial authority to determine the
sufficiency of a surety and its argument that surety bail agents retain the common law authority
of the "bail" [Appellants' Reply Brief, pg. 10-1 11 is somewhat inconsistent with its insistence
that the Guidelines do not make bail agents "co-sureties."

2.

No abusive practices demonstrate the need for criminal history checks in
additioii to those conducted by the DO1

In reliance upon a footnote in a law review article, the Fourth District claims that court
regulation of bail agents is necessary because of widespread "abuses and corruption in the
commercial bondslnan system, including infiltration of criminals and organized crime illto the
bonding business, bondsman payoffs to police and court officials and failure to pay off forfeited
bonds." Appellants' Reply Brief, pg. 4, citing to Peggy M . Tobolowsky, Pvetrial Release in the
1990s: Texas Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditions, 19 New Eng. J. on Crim.
& Civ. Confinement 267, 275,n.40 (Summer 1993). This claim is not credible nor is it even

supported by the law review article itself.
First, the substantial record in this case is entirely devoid of any evidence of abuses or
corruption. Indeed, this litigation was pursued by the Bail Plaintiffs after adverse action was
taken by the Fourth District against Aladdin bail agents over matters such as a dog at large
citation [App. Exh. 121, a seven year old withheld judgment for a misdemeanor [App. Exh. 16,
exh. 1-31 and a dismissed juvenile proceeding [App. Exh. 25, Exh. A 1.
Second, the footnote of the law review article quoted by the Fourth District concerned the
evolution of the American system of pretrial release and specifically, the results of studies in the
$?st h a y o f the twentieth century of the administration of bail in three cities, Chicago, New York
and Philadelphia. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Pretrial Release in the 1990s, 19 New Eng. J. on
Crim. & Civ. Confinement at 275. The study in Chicago, for example, occurred in 1927.
According to this article, the concerns for greater individualized determination of bail were
addressed in 1946 with the adoption of Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The

Fourth District makes no mention of the foregoing in its sweeping reliance upon this language.
Suffice it to say, comparing bail issues which existed in Chicago in the 1920's prior to the
adoption of Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 46 with modern bail in Idaho is simply unpersuasive. It certainly
speaks volumes that the Fourth District has no evidence of corruption in the record to support its
argument that court regulation of bail agents as provided for in the Guidelines is necessary to
prevent conuption. It instead relies upon studies from over a half century ago at a time when the
bail system was much different and in places like Chicago, "payoffs to police and court officials"
were a concern.
Moreover, contrary to the Fourth District's contention that "unscrupulous bail agents
could easily run amok, writing one bad bond after another" if it lacked the authority to regulate
those agellts [Appellants' Brief, pg. 271, the district court held that the Fourth District may
prevent a bail agent from posting bonds "where the surety on whose behalf the bail agent is
currently seeking to post bonds has an outstanding forfeiture, is precluded from issuing bonds or
is financially insolvent" [R. (Vol. 111) pg. 4961. The Fourth District inexplicably contends that
the Bail Plaintiffs' reliance on this provision of the district cou~?'sruling is inconsistent as
"Aladdin asks the Court to strilte down this very portion of the Guidelines because, according to
Aladdin, it improperly makes bail agents 'co-sureties' on bonds." Appellants' Reply Brief, pg.4.
The Bail Plaintiffs have not challeliged either the district court's ruling that the Fourth
District may prevent a bail agent fi-omposting bonds on behalf of a defaulting surety [R. (Vol.
111) pg. 4961 or the section of the Guidelines adopted in response to the declaratory ruling [R.
(Vol. 111) pg. 5471, which provides for an authorized list of sureties. Rather, the Bail Plaintiffs'
object to imposing personal responsibility for payment of forfeited bonds on bail agents

individually, and then evaluating bail agents' character and fitness to determine whether an agent
is fit, in the eyes the ADJ and TCA, for acceptance of that responsibility.

3.

The courts do not have daily interactions with individual bail agents

The Fourth District further contends that it "makes the most sense to have the courts those interacting with and monitoring bail agents on a daily basis - control those agents'
interaction with the couit system directly." Appellants' Reply Brief, pg. 5. However, unlike a
court reporter [Appellants' Reply Brief; pg. 81 or deputy clerk, a bail agent interacts with and
provides a service to the general public and does not provide a direct service to the court.
Whereas court reporters literally "operate in courtrooms," other than appeaing on motions Tor
relief from forfeiture - which in Aladdin's situation is handled by its general counsel not its bail
agents - bail agents do not regularly interact with the court. Thus, it is unclear what "daily"
interaction with the court the Fourth District is referring to. Rather, bail agents' assessment of
whether they should bind the surety to guarantee a particular defendant's appearance does not
take place in the courtroom and, instead, involves interaction with the defendant and his family in
the community. Indeed, the Guidelines prohibit bail agents from soliciting business or taking
defendants into custody in the courthouse. The county jails, criminal defendants, and their family

- not the courts and the TCA - have daily interaction with bail agents.
4.

Conclusion

The only potential use for a criminal history chcck is to evaluate the character and fitness
of bail agents. The district court col-rectly determined that the ADJ may not require bail agents to
submit to a character and fitness evaluation and that the substantive licensing procedure set forth
in the Guidelines is unlawful. It necessarily follows that the Fourth District cannot require bail

agents to submit to periodic ciiminal history checks as a condition of their placement on the
authorized list. Accordingly, this Court should reverse Paragraph Five of the declaratory
judgment and permanent injunction

B.

The District Court Erred in Determining That the Guidelines Provide Adequate
Procedural Due Process with Regard to a Bail Agent's Removal Following the
TCA's Determination That the Agent Has Not Timely Rectified a Violation
Permitting the TCA to Remove the Agent from the Authorized List

1.

The Bail Plaintiffs have a protected interest in practicing their professions in
the Fourth District

A court order precluding a bail agent froin writing bail bonds in a particular county must
meet requirements of procedural due process. State v. AAA Aaron 's Action Agency Bail Bonds,
993 S.W.2d 81,85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see also Board ofRegenrs v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
572 (1972) (liberty, as protected by due process, must be interpreted broadly and certainly
encompasses the right of persons to contract and to engage in their chosen occupation); H cPr V

Engineering, Inc. v. Iclaho State Rd. of of Projessioonl Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113
Idaho 646,649,747 P.2d 55, 58 (1987) (right to practice a chosen profession is a valuable
property right which cannot be deprived unless one is provided with the safeguards of due
process). When the Fourth District removes a bail agent from the authorized list, the Fourth
District prevents that agent from practicing his or her profession. Therefore, the Bail Plaintiffs
have a protected interest in continuing placement on the authorized list
The Fourth District cites to two extra-jurisdictional cases, Tunica County v. Hanzpton Co.

Nat. Suv., LLC, -So.3d -,

2009 WL 1232704 (Miss. 2009) and Humpton Co. Nat. Sur.,

LLC v. Tunica County, Miss., 543 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2008), in support of its argument that bail
agents have no protected interest in practicing their professions in the Fourth District. Cross-

Respondents' Brief, pg. 3-4. In Tunica, a case that did not involve procedural due process, the
court concluded that a Mississippi statute gave the sheriff authority to evaluate the sufficiency of
a surety. In Humpton, which was decided shortly before Tunica, the court noted that the
plaintiffs would not have an interest protected by procedural due process in writing bonds in a
county if the sheriff was found to have the discretion to determine the sufficiency of a particular
surety as was at issue in Tunica.
Here, neither the ADJ nor the TCA have the discretion to determine the "sufficiency" of a
surety or its bail agent. Rather, surety companies meeting requirements set forth by the DO1 are
authorized to become the sole surety on bail bonds and all courts and judges "shall accept and
treat such bond" as "fully and completely complying" with the requirements of law. I.C. 5
41-2604. The Bail Act defines a bail bond as a "sufficient" surety and both a statute and this
Court's rules prohibit the court from requiring a defendant to post a particular form of
"sufficient" surety. LC. 5 19-2907(2); I.C.R. 46(f)(l).
Moreover, the Guidelines have specific criteria for placement on the authorized list which
can be contrasted with the type of broad discretion granted officials which precludes a reasonable
expectation in a benefit for purposes of procedural due process. The Fourth District
acknowledges that bail agents might have a protected interest in their bail agent licenses.
Appellants' Brief, pg. 16-17. The criteria for placement on the Fourth District authorized list and
a bail agent license through the DO1 are substantially identical, the primary distinction being the
geographic scope of the authorization - within a judicial district or statewide. Compare LC. 5
41-1016(1)(f) & (h) with R. (Vol. 11) pg. 358, 362. Due process prohibits the unreasonable
deprivation of protected interests, whether the government entity causing the deprivation is the

state legislature, county official or court or other subdivision of that state government. Thus, as
held by the district court, the.Guidelines are "sufficiently similar to a licensing scheme" that "a
property right attaches" to bail agents' authorization to post bonds in the Fourth District. R.
(Vol. 111) pg. 484.
The Bail :Plaintiffshave protected interests in continuing to pursue their occupations in
the Fourth District and in continuing placement on the authorized list. Thus, this Court should
affirm the district court's conclusion that "the hail agent is entitled to due process in any
proceeding to add or remove him or her from" the authorized list. R. (Vol. 111) pg. 484.

2.

Standard

In determining whether the Guidelines comport with procedural due process, the district
court cites Ai7zerican Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2. v. Iciaho Dep't of Water Resources, 143 Idaho
862, 870271, 154 P.3d 433,441-42 (2007), which discussed the "facial" and "as applied" analysis
utilized to determine if a statute or administrative rule is unconstitutional. Without citation to
authority, the Fourth District broadly asserts that the district court's "facialias-applied approach
often goes hand in-hand with the mat hew^'^ balancing test." Cross-Respondents' Brief, pg. 2
u.2. Initially, the district couit did not discuss the balancing test and thus did not apply the two
analyses together.
Further, the facialias applied analysis, as traditionally described, is inappropriate when
undertaking judicial review of judicial action. In a facial constitutional challenge such as that
discussed in the case cited to by the district court -American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2. - the
party must demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications and there are no

Mathews v. Elciridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
9

circumsta~~ces
under which the law would be valid. American Falls Resewoir Dist. No. 2.,143
Idaho at 869, 154 P.3d at 440. This deferential standard arises because tile judicial power to
declare legislative actioi15unconstitutional should be exercised only in clear cases and an
appellate court is obligated to seek a11 interpretation of a statute that upholds it constitutionality.

See Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232,237,207 P.3d 963,968 (2009), citing Amen'can
Falls Resewoir Dist. No. 2., 143 Idaho at 869, 154 P.3d at 440. Such separation of powers
concerns are of course absent in this Court's review of local judicial guidelines. Regardless of
whether the "facial" or "as applied" analysis would have been appropriate in determining
t eadministrative rule complies with procedural due process pursuant to
whether a s t a t ~ ~or

Mathews, ihe standard is inappropriate for judicial review of a district court guideline. See State

v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738,741, 170 P.3d 881, 884 (2007) (applying Mathews to court action
without discussion of faciallas applied analysis).
The Fourth District also contends that the Rail Plaintiffs were required to show that the
Guidelines provide for arbitrary and capricious enforcement. Cross-Respondents' Brief, pg. 4-5.
The Bail Plaintiffs have not raised a substantive due process claim to the Guidelines. Therefore,
it is unnecessary to assess whether the standard to prevail on a substantive due process claim has
been met
3.

Due process requires meaningful notice and an opportunity to contest the
TCA's determination that a violation has not been rectified

Administrative rules - as distinguished from district court guidelines - are subject to
the same principles of construction as statutes because ail administrative rule or regulation is an
integral part of the statute under which it originates just as though it were prescribed in terms
therein. See Ifigginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,690-91,604 P.2d 51,54-55 (1979).

Section 14(I)(B) of the Guidelines permits the TCA to remove a bail agent without prior
notice following the TCA's unilateral determination that the bail agent failed to timely rectify a
violation identified in a previous notice. Although a bail agent can contest the alleged violatio~l
before removal, the Guidelines do not provide for notice or an opportunity to contest the TCA's
rejection of an agent's attempt to "rectify" the violation. In these situations, the Guidelines fail to
provide for meaningfiul notice or the opportunity to be heard at a meaningfit1 time. Accordingly,
this Court should reverse the portion of the district court's opinion denying the Bail Plaintiffs'
request for a declaration that the Guidelines violate procedural due process.
The Fourth District caustically characterizes requiring the TCA to infonn a bail agent that
it plans to reject the bail agent's attempt to comply with a violation notice as notifying the bail
agent "a third time that - yes, the TCA's office really nleans it - the bail agent is going to be
removed from the list." Cross-Respondents' Brief, pg. 7. I-Iowever, a bail agent is first notified
that the TCA believes he or she has violated the Guidelines upon receipt of a "violation notice"
such as the January 3,2006 notice to Mr. Garske. Such a violation notice i n h s the bail agent
that if he or she rectifies the violation within 10 days, the bail agent will not be removed. The
notice suggested by the Bail Plaintiffs would not be a "third" or even second notice that the TCA
"really means it" but, rather, a meaningful response to a bail agent's attempt to rectify the alleged
violation.
The Fourth District contends that "the TCA's office is not a babysitter for delinquent bail
agents. It was Mr. Garske's responsibility to provide the documents required under the
Guidelines in conjunction with annual renewal of his producer's license; he did not do so."
Cross-Respondents' Brief, pg. 10. However, Mr. Garske did provide all the required documents

in response to the violation notice. The annual renewal materials include submitting to "a
criminal history records fingerprint check completed" by the ISP, submitting a renewal
application with a copy of the DO1 license and any updated copy of contracts between the agent
and the surety. R. (Vol. 11) pg. 351. The day after6 receiving the TCA's violatioil notice, Mr.
Garske submitted to a crimirtal history check at the ISP and submitted a renewal application with
a copy of his updated bail agent license and a copy of the ISP receipt to the TCA. The
Guidelines require the TCA to receive the criminal history check results directly from ISP and it
will not accept them from the bail agent. R. (Vol. 11) pg. 360 (Guideline §12(4): criminal history
checks received from address other than ISP will not be accepted). Thus, it was not Mr. Garske's
responsibility to submit the criminal history check results to the TCA and by submitting the
required documents, including verification that he submitted to the required criminal history
check, he did everything he was required to in response to the TCA's violation notice. Only the
TCA would know whether it received criminal history results directly from the ISP and notice
that it intended to reject Mr. Garske's compliance with the violation notice would not have been
a redundant "third" notice.
Further, the other 38 agents who were removed because the TCA did not receive Mr.
Garske's criminal history results from ISP were not copied on the January 3,2006 notice to Mr.
Garske. Thus, the bail agents other than Mr. Garske who were put out of work for four days
received no notice, meaningful or otherwise, that their interest in continuing to work in their
professions was jeopardized.

The violation notice, which was sent via U.S. mail, was received by Mr. Garske the day
after it was sent on January 4,2006. See App. Exh. 8,7 14.

Finally, an important aspect of the Mathews ' balancing test involves balancing the private
and government interests at slalce. See Muthews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. Thus, the amount of notice
due and the circumstances in which the deprivation can occur without a prior hearing directly
corresponds to the relative weight of the government and private interests at stake. The Fourth
District has not identified the grave interest at stake in receiving redundant criminal history
checks, such that putting almost forty people out of work for four days without a prior hearing is
necessary to protect that interesl. Whatever government interest the Fourth District has in
receiving criminal history check results is somewhat lessened where, as here, it had a signed
declaration that a bail agent had incurred no criminal charges and a receipt demonstrating the
agent submitted to the required criminal history check. Weighing the Fourth District's minimal
interest in receiving the criminal history results against the significant interest of Mr. Garske,
Aladdin and the thirty-eight agents in continuing to earn their livelihood, establishes that due
process required a pre-deprivation hearing.
Application of the Muthews' balancing test establishes that the procedures for summary
removal in Section 14(I)(B) violate procedural due process as a matter of law. Accordingly, the
Bail Plaintiffs are entitled to sumlnaly judgment in their favor enjoining the Fourth District from
enforcing those summary removal provisions and the district court erred in its contrary
conclusion.
111. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in the Bail Plaintiffs' Cross-Appellants' Brief, the
Bail Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this Court reverse paragraph five of the Declaratory Judgment
and Pennanent Injunction, insofar as it allows the Fourth District to require bail agents to submit

to a criminal history check. The Bail Plaintiffs further ask the Court to reverse the district court's
partial denial of their summary judgment motion based on the district court's conclusion that the
Guidelines comply with procedural due process.
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